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I. INTRODUCTION

The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (the "Act"), as codified in
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957,1 has long been an exceedingly potent weapon in
the hands of federal prosecutors. The Act criminalizes certain financial transactions involving the "proceeds" of over 250 underlying predicate offenses, also
known as "specified unlawful activities" ("SUAs"). 2 The power and prosecutorial value of the Act come largely from its wide reach and versatility 3 (the
predicate offense list includes virtually all white-collar crimes) 4 as well as its
relatively harsh sentencing 5 and forfeiture 6 provisions, which make determining
the precise application of the statute of paramount importance. The mere threat
of a money laundering charge and these accompanying sentencing possibilities
is enough to send many defendants scurrying for a plea bargain.
A determination of what exactly counts as criminally derived
"proceeds" under the Act would seem to be vital to determining liability; however, for over two decades, the term "proceeds" was curiously left undefined by
the Act itself.8 This omission left the parameters of the word up for debate in
the United States courts of appeals, several of which rendered contradictory

Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956,
1957 (West 2009)).
2
See MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
LAUNDERING
OFFENDERS,
1994-2001
2
(2003),
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf mlo0l.pdf [hereinafter DEP'T OF
MONEY

(citing

available

at

JUSTICE STATISTICS]

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MONEY LAUNDERING STATUTES AND RELATED MATERIALS, ASSET

see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(3), (c)(7).
2. For an argument that the Money Laundering Control Act as currently utilized by prosecutors and the courts is too broad, see Elizabeth

FORFEITURE AND MONEY LAUNDERING SECTION (2002));
3
See DEP'T OF JUSTICE STATISTICS. supra note 2. at

Johnson & Larry Thompson, Money Laundering: Business Beware, 44 ALA. L. REv. 703 (1993).

See also Teresa E. Adams, Note, Tacking on Money Laundering Chargesto White Collar Crimes:
What Did Congress Intend, and What Are the Courts Doing?, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 531 (2000).
4
See DEP'T OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 2; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).
5
See infra notes 49
55 and accompanying text; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2S1.1 (2003).
6
See infra notes 56 - 60 and accompanying text; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 981-982 (2006).
7
See generally Eric J. Gouvin, Are There Any Checks and Balances on the Government's
Power to Check Our Balances? The Fate of FinancialPrivacy in the War on Terrorism, 14 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 517, 534-35 (2005) (noting that "prosecutors have used money laundering violations as a device to leverage up the criminal consequences for regulated behavior, creating incentives for the accused to plea bargain"): see also United States v. Santos, 128 S.Ct. 2020,
2026 (2008) (plurality opinion) (noting that with the harsh sentencing guidelines, "[p]rosecutors,
of course, would acquire the discretion to charge the lesser [predicate] offense, the greater moneylaundering offense, or both
which would predictably be used to induce a plea bargain to the
lesser charge.").
8
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (2006) (lacking any definition of "proceeds"). The Act was
amended to include a definition of "proceeds" on May 20. 2009. See infra notes 310 316 and
accompanying text.
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decisions. 9 Specifically, disagreement arose over the definition of "proceeds" in
the principal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), which criminalizes knowing financial transactions involving unlawfully derived "proceeds"
with the intent to promote the SUA, conceal the unlawful source of the
"proceeds," or violate tax laws or reporting requirements.10 Circuits divided
over whether the term "proceeds" in this statute included "gross receipts" - the
total amount of funds derived from the predicate offense" 1 - or was limited to
simply "profits" 1 2- the revenues left over after the expenses of the predicate
offense are paid.
The importance of this seemingly esoteric definitional battle can be seen
in the case of Efrain Santos, whose case eventually reached the Supreme
Court. 13 Santos operated an illegal gambling business in Indiana that involved
using the gamblers' bets to pay the lottery's employees and winners.14 Utilizing
the "gross receipts" definition of "proceeds," the district court found that these
payments constituted the offense of promotional money laundering.1 5 In contrast, had the "profits" definition been used, these payments would have been
considered as mere expenses involved in the substantive offense of operating an
illegal gambling business,1 6and Santos would not have been convicted of any
money laundering charges.
Santos was ultimately convicted of one count of conspiracy to run an illegal gambling business, 7 one count of running an illegal gambling business, 18
one count of conspiracy to launder money,1 9 and two counts of money launder9
10

See discussion infra Part JI.B.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).

11
In various cases and commentary, this "gross receipts" definition of "proceeds" is referred
to by several terms (including "gross income," "gross proceeds," "receipts," etc). For the purposes
of clarity, this Note changes all references that encompass the "gross receipts" definition to the
singular term "gross receipts."
12 In various cases and commentary, this "profits" definition of "proceeds" is referred to by

several terms (including "net receipts," "net proceeds," etc). For the purposes of clarity, this Note
changes all references that encompass the "profits" definition to the singular term "profits."
13 United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008).
14 Id. at 2022 23 (plurality opinion).
15
Id. at 2023.
16 See United States v. Santos, 342 F. Supp. 2d 781, 798-99 (N.D. Ind. 2004) ("[I]n order for
Santos to be guilty of money laundering under [the "profits" definition], the money used by Santos in the financial transactions between himself and his couriers and/or winners for purposes of
promoting his gambling business must have derived from the net proceeds of his illegal gambling
business.... [T]he constitution of those proceeds (net versus gross) was never determined.... [I]t
clearly appears that the proceeds admittedly used by Santos to pay winners and couriers could
only have been gross proceeds ....
" (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)): see also United
States v. Febus, 218 F.3d 784, 789 90 (7th Cir. 2000).
17
Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2023 (plurality opinion) (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371).
18 Id.(inviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955).
19 Id. (in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (h)).
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ing. ° Santos was sentenced to sixty months of imprisonment on each of the two
gambling counts and 210 months of imprisonment on each of the three money
laundering counts, all to be served concurrently.' In contrast, had Santos been
sentenced under the "profits" definition, he would likely have received a total
sentence of just sixty concurrent months for each of the gambling counts.
Thus, the use of a "gross receipts" definition of "proceeds" in Santos' case
meant that he was sentenced to spend an extra twelve and a half years of his life
in federal prison.
The Seventh Circuit was the first to speak directly on this issue. 3 The
court maintained that the term "proceeds" only included the "profits" of the
underlying offense and argued that to hold otherwise would merge the necessary
transactions needed to complete the predicate crime with the separate offense of
24
money laundering, essentially giving two punishments for the same conduct.
This approach was subsequently rejected by the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits,
which all held the term to include all "gross receipts" from illegal activi25
ty.
The United States Supreme Court seemed poised to end the circuit debate when it granted certiorari in the aforementioned case United States v. Santos. 2 6 However, the fractured and acrimonious opinion released by the plurality
did little more than muddy the waters. Indisputably, the Court held that
"proceeds" means "profits," not "gross receipts," for the predicate crime of operating an unlicensed gambling business 7 Whether this "profits" definition of
"proceeds" extends to the funds derived from other predicate offenses, however,
is up for much debate; the decision splintered 4 1-4, with the Justices themselves lobbing numerous verbal barbs disparaging the precedential weight of
each other's decisions.28
Since the Santos decision, district courts have been all over the map in
applying the "profits" definition to SUAs outside of the gambling context . 29
Indeed, one court noted that the Santos decision "raises as many issues as it re-

21

Id. (in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1)(A)(i)).
Id.

22

See supranote 16 and accompanying text.

23

United States v. Scialabba, 282 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2002); see also NATHAN REILLY, BUREAU

20

OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, WHITE COLLAR CRIME REPORT, THE MEANING OF MONEY LAUNDERING
"PROCEEDS": A CIRCUIT SPLIT RIPE FOR RESOLUTION 2 (March 16. 2007).

24

Scialabba,282 F. 3d at 477.

25

See discussion infra Part II.B.2.; see also United States v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir.

2005); United States v. Grasso, 381 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 544 U.S. 945 (2005), reinstatedin relevantpart, 197 F. App'x 200 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. lacaboni, 363 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978 (2004).
26
128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008).
27

Id. at 2034 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring).

28

See discussion infra Part III.B. .e., Part III.B.2., and Part III.B.3.d.

29

See discussion infra Part IV.
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solves for the lower courts.,, 30 The 111 th Congress, in an attempt to clarify the
burgeoning judicial problem, responded to Santos by quickly voting through the
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 ("FERA") in its first session,
with President Obama signing it into law on May 20, 2009. 3 1 Notably, FERA
adds a new paragraph to the Money Laundering Control Act that defines the
term "proceeds" to include the "gross receipts" of a specified unlawful activity.32 However, this amendment does little for the tumultuous state of the law
that Santos left immediately in its wake; FERA is silent on the issue of retroactivity, and as such it only applies to conduct that occurs after May 20, 2009. 33
However, the 34
passage of this statute has added some interesting layers to the
Santos debate.
This Note takes stock of the growing circuit split for post-Santos cases
and classifies the lower court decisions analyzing Santos into three categories:
Narrow, Moderate, and Broad Santos. Narrow Santos courts have restricted the
application of the "profits" definition to the predicate offense of operating an
unlawful gambling business, Moderate Santos courts have expanded the "profits" definition to some predicate offenses but not to others, and Broad Santos
courts have thus far applied the "profits" definition to all Section 1956 predicate
offenses. This Note provides a critical look at these three categories and eventually advocates for an adoption of the Broad Santos position.
In order to provide some context, Part ii of this Note briefly outlines 18
U.S.C. § 1956, the principal money laundering statute at issue in Santos, and
describes the original circuit split concerning the definition of "proceeds." In
Part iii, this Note offers a detailed description and analysis of the various opinions in the divided Santos case. Finally, in Part IV, this Note categorizes and
analyzes the post-Santos case law, concluding that a uniform application of the
"profits" definition of "proceeds" provides the most equitable and legally sound
interpretation of Santos.

30

United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 783 (5th Cir. 2008).

3

Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 386, 123 Stat. 1617
(2009).
32
See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9) ("[T]he term 'proceeds' means any property derived from or
obtained or retained, directly or indirectly, through some form of unlawful activity, including the
gross receipts of such activity." (emphasis added)).
33
See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994); see also United States v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803. 814 n.12 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that "Congress subsequently amended the
money laundering statute to expressly define proceeds to include gross receipts ....
Our task,
therefore, is to determine how the Santos Court would interpret 'proceeds' with respect to mail
fraud committed prior to the statute's amendment in May 2009.").
34
See infra notes 310 316 and accompanying text.
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ii. BACKGROUND
While this Note deals exclusively with the issues surrounding the term
"proceeds" as it is used in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), a brief overview of money
laundering laws is helpful. As such, Part I.A of this Note describes the history
and scope of the Money Laundering Control Act in general and then outlines
Section 1956 in particular, with a focus on the Section's severe penalties. Part
II.B then provides a description and analysis of the circuit split that predated the
Santos case.
A.

Relevant Money LaunderingStatutes

The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 was signed into law as part
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.
This Act, the first direct attack on the
offense of money laundering, 36 attempts to curb the use of illicit funds by criminalizing certain transactions involving the "proceeds" of unlawful activity."
Since its inception, the purpose and scope of the Money Laundering Control Act
have been a point of contention for many legal scholars.38 Proponents of a narrow interpretation of the Act argue that it was created in the context of the "war
on drugs" with the specific purpose of eliminating profits for drug trafficking
and organized crime and was not originally meant to be used to "tack on" separate money laundering charges for economic crimes outside of these areas. 39
Supporters of a broader view argue that the Act was meant to criminalize money
laundering activity in all of its forms.40
Irrespective of this ongoing debate, both the courts and Congress have
been slowly expanding the Act's reach. It now covers financial transactions
involving the "proceeds" of over 250 underlying predicate offenses and is capable of being applied as an additional charge to almost all economic or white-

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Title 1: Subtitle H: Money Laundering Control Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 1957
(2006)): see also Kelly Neal Carpenter, Eighth Survey of White CollarCrime: Money Laundering,
35

30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 813, 820 (1993).
36

3
L.
38

Carpenter, supra note 35, at 820.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957; see also Mark A. Provost, Money Laundering,46 AM. CRIM.
REV. 837, 838 (2009).
For an overview of this debate, see Adams. supra note 3. at 545 48.

See generally id. at 548 (concluding that the application of the Act surpasses Congress'
intention to fight drugs and organized crime): see also Johnson & Thompson, supra note 3. at
703 04. The defense bar in particular has long been a proponent of a narrowed interpretation and

39

application of the Act.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS

NACDL MONEY LAUNDERING

(NACDL).

NACDL PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE FEDERAL MONEY
LAUNDERING STATUTES (Aug. 1, 2001), http://www.criminaljustice.org/public.nsf/legislation/
CI 01 018?opendocument [hereinafter NACDL MONEY LAUNDERING TASK FORCE].
40
See Adams. supranote 3, at 548.
TASK FORCE,
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collar crimes.4 1 Indeed, it is extremely rare for a money laundering charge to
stand alone; the vast majority of money laundering charges are coupled with at
least one other offense, and money laundering often has the most severe penalties of all of the offenses charged.42
As described supra, the Money Laundering Control Act is codified into
two separate sections, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957. Section 1956 generally concerns the knowing
transaction, transportation, or transfer of unlawfully derived
"proceeds. 4 3 Section 1957 is potentially broader than its counterpart a4 and addresses all financial
transactions involving unlawfully derived property exceed45
ing $10,000.
Section 1956, the focus of this Note, generally criminalizes three types
of activity. Subsection 1956(a)(1) prohibits knowing participation in domestic
transactions that involve criminal "proceeds" with the intent to (1) promote the
predicate offense ("promotional money laundering"), (2) violate portions of the
Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") or avoid reporting requirements, or (3) otherwise conceal the source of the criminal proceeds ("concealment money laundering"). 46 Similarly, Subsection 1956(a)(2) forbids the knowing transportation of
criminally derived monetary instruments into or through foreign commerce with
41

See DEP'T OF JUSTICE

42

Mariano-Florentino Cud1lar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money

STATISTICS,

supra note 2, at 2; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).

Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance. 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 414-15

(2003).
43

Carpenter, supra note 35, at 820.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2006). Section 1957 is largely beyond the scope of this Note, but see
Emily J. Lawrence, Let the Seller Beware: Money Laundering,Merchants and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956,
1957, 33 B.C. L. REV. 841 (1992) for a discussion of the criticism of Section 1957 for its broad
44

reach.
45

See 18 U.S.C. § 1957.

46

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1):
Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity
(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity' or
(ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section
7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal
law,

shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value
of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years. or both....
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the intent to (1) promote the predicate offense, (2) violate portions of the IRC or
avoid reporting requirements, or (3) otherwise conceal the source of the criminal
proceeds. 4' Finally, Subsection 1956(a)(3) essentially authorizes the use of covert government operations to expose violations of the statute, as it criminalizes
transactions involving what are represented to be the proceeds of an unlawful
activity.48

Violators of Section 1956 find themselves facing some particularly virulent penalties. A defendant sentenced under the statute faces a statutory maximum of up to twenty years' imprisonment and a potential fine of either
$500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, whi5
chever is greater.49 Under the relevant sentencing guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, 1
a Section 1956 conviction also increases the base offense level for the predicate
offense by two levels. 5' Moreover, despite the fact that this widely criticized
47

48

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2).
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3); see also Provost, supra note 37. at 843.

49

See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 ("Whoever [violates this statute] ... shall be sentenced to a fine of
not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever
is greater. or imprisonment for not more than twenty years. or both.").
50
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.1 (2003):
(a) Base Offense Level:
(1) The offense level for the underlying offense from which the laundered
funds were derived, if (A) the defendant committed the underlying offense (or
would be accountable for the underlying offense under subsection (a)(1)(A) of
§ 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)); and (B) the offense level for that offense can be
determined: or
(2) 8 plus the number of offense levels from the table in § 2B 1.1 (Theft. Property Destruction, and Fraud) corresponding to the value of the laundered
funds, otherwise.
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If (A) subsection (a)(2) applies; and (B) the defendant knew or believed
that any of the laundered funds were the proceeds of, or were intended to
promote (i) an offense involving the manufacture, importation, or distribution
of a controlled substance or a listed chemical; (ii) a crime of violence; or (iii)
an offense involving firearms, explosives, national security, or the sexual exploitation of a minor, increase by 6 levels.
(2) (Apply the Greatest):
(A) If the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1957, increase by 1
level.

51

(B) If the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, increase by 2
levels.
(C) If (i) subsection (a)(2) applies; and (ii) the defendant was in the business of laundering funds, increase by 4 levels.
(3) If (A) subsection (b)(2)(B) applies; and (B) the offense involved sophisticated laundering, increase by 2 levels.
Id. at § 2SI.I(b)(2)(B).
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sentencing guideline5 2 was amended in 2001 in order to alleviate disproportionately high sentences 53 and connect the punishment for money laundering more
closely to the underlying offense,54 the addition of a money laundering charge
can still result in a greatly increased statutory maximum and a sentence that is
much larger than the sentence for the predicate offense.5 5
Money laundering offenses also trigger the broad civil and criminal forfeiture provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 98156 and 982, 57 which permit the forfeiture
of property which is "involved in" an attempted or actual financial transaction in
violation of the Act. 58 Prosecutors have been able to seize "bank accounts, investment funds, . . . currency, the entire assets of businesses, motor vehicles[,]
aircraft[s], [and] real property which is the site of money laundering activity"
using these statutes, 59 which are applicable without regard to the magnitude of
the money laundering activity or the severity of the underlying offense.60
Given the high stakes of a money laundering prosecution, knowledge of
the precise conduct that would bring one into the purview of the statute is vital.
As Section 1956 criminalizes financial transactions involving the "proceeds" of
a SUA, the importance of this term in determining chargeable conduct cannot be
overstated.

52

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: MONEY LAUNDERING

WORKING
53
Id.

GROUP, http://www.ussc.gov/moneylau/monisum.htm (last visited Feb. 23. 2010).

54
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 50, at app. C. vol. i1, amend. 634 (2001),
reason for amend. (2006) (stating that the guideline was amended in order to "tie[] offense levels
for money laundering more closely to the underlying conduct...").
55 See discussion of the "merger problem," infra Part III.B. I.c. Interestingly, although FERA
legislatively overruled Santos, the "merger problem" remained a concern. See infra notes 3 10316 and accompanying text.
56
18 U.S.C. § 981 (2006):

57

(a)(1) The following property is subject to forfeiture to the United States:
(A) Any property. real or personal. involved in a transaction or attempted
transaction in violation of section 1956, 1957 or 1960 of this title, or any
property traceable to such property.
18 U.S.C. § 982 (2006):

58

(a) (1) The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in
violation of section 1956, 1957, or 1960 of this title, shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property. real or personal. involved in such
offense, or any property traceable to such property.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 982.

59

George Chamberlin, What Is Considered Property "involved in" Money Laundering Offense, and Thus Subject to Civil or Criminal Forfeiture,for Purposes of Money Laundering Control Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(1)(A) and 982(a)(1)), 135 A.L.R. FED. 367, § 2(a) (originally published in 1996) (citations omitted).
60
NACDL MONEY LAUNDERING TASK FORCE. supra note 39.
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This Note, as does the Santos case, addresses the term "proceeds" as
found in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), 6 1 under which the majority of federal money
laundering charges are brought. 62 The term "proceeds" is central to two separate
elements of Section 1956 offenses. The Government must prove (1) that a transaction "in fact involves the proceeds" of a SUA as well as (2) the defendant's
knowledge that the property involved in the transaction "represents the
63
proceeds" of a SUA.
As discussed supra, prior to Santos and the subsequent legislative remedy of FERA, the term "proceeds" was nowhere to be found in the definitional
64
section of Section 1956, and the original legislative history's elucidation of the
65
issue is debatable.
Thus, the coming circuit split came as little surprise.
B.

The Battle Begins: The OriginalCircuit Split Explained

In 2002, the Seventh Circuit became the first appellate court to directly
address the issue of a "gross receipts" vs. "profits" definition of the term
"proceeds" in Section 1956. Since then, the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits
weighed in on the matter and reached the opposite conclusion.
sesses each of these decisions in turn.
1.

This Part as-

The Seventh Circuit: "Profits" Rule

In United States v. Scialabba,66 the Seventh Circuit held that Section
1956 only prohibited transactions involving criminal "profits," not transactions
involving "[gross] criminal receipts."' 6' The Scialabba case, like Santos68 after
it, involved a defendant that was convicted of running an illegal gambling business. 6 9 Defendant Scialabba used the money from bettors to compensate winning customers, pay bar and restaurant owners for their assistance, and fix gambling machines. 70 As a result of these transactions, Scialabba and his codefendant were convicted of promotional money laundering under Section
1956(a)(1)(A)(i). I
61

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).

62

NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT

397

(West 3d ed. 2000).
63
United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2023 (2008) (plurality opinion) (citing 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1)).
64
See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c).
65

Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3, 2032, 2038, 2040.

66

United States v. Scialabba, 282 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2002).

67

Id. at 478.

68

Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2022 (plurality opinion).

69

Scialabba,282 F.3d. at 475.

70

Id.

71

Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss3/14

10

Zimarowski: Taking a Gamble: Money Laundering after United States v. Santos
TAKING A GAMBLE

2010]

1149

On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Scialabba argued that the term
"proceeds" in Section 1956(a)(1) referred to only the "profits," not the "gross
receipts," of an offense. 2 The Seventh Circuit noted the lack of definitional
clarity in the term, as it had been left undefined by both the statute and the
courts, and argued that the rule of lenity73 dictated an adherence to the "profits"
definition to "avoid catching people by surprise." 74
The court also described what was to become known as the "merger
problem:" when the predicate crime in question involves business-like operations, the use of a "gross receipts" definition of "proceeds" causes the predicate
crime to "merge[] into money laundering (for no business can be carried on75
without expenses) and the word 'proceeds' loses operational significance.,
The court stated,
If... the word "proceeds" is synonymous with gross [receipts],
then we would have to decide whether, as a matter of statutory
construction (distinct from double jeopardy), it is appropriate to
convict a person of multiple offenses when the transactions that
violate one statute necessarily violate another. By reading §
1956(a)(1) to cover only transactions involving profits, we curtail the overlap and ensure that the statutes may be applied independently to sequential steps in a criminal enterprise. 16
The court consequently vacated the money laundering convictions of both Scialabba and his co-defendant, finding that their convictions necessarily rested on
the incorrect "gross receipts" definition of "proceeds."
2.

The First, Third, and Eighth Circuits: "Gross Receipts" Rule

Following the Scialabbadecision, the First Circuit created a circuit split
with its holding in United States v. Jacaboni,77 a case that once again involved a
78
defendant convicted of both illegal gambling and money laundering crimes. 78
The court, asked to re-evaluate the proper amount to be forfeited in relation to
the money laundering conviction, upheld the district court's use of the "gross
receipts" version of "proceeds. ' 79 The Jacaboni court looked to its previous
72

Id.

"when a statute is irreconcilably ambiguous, the tie goes to the
defendant." Harvard Law Review Ass'n, Leading Cases: Federal Statutes and Regulations: Aloney Laundering: Rule of Lenity, 122 HARV. L. REv. 475, 475 (2008).
74 Scialabba,282 F.3d at 475.
73

The rule of lenity states that

75

Id.

76
77

Id. at 476 (citations omitted).

78

Id. at2.

79

Id.at 6, 8.

363 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004).
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determination of the word "proceeds" as used in the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").80 The First Circuit had previously held
that the legislative history of the RICO statute indicated that "the term
'proceeds' [in RICO] ha[d] been used in lieu of the term 'profits' in order to
alleviate the unreasonable burden on the government of proving [] profits." 81
The court found this reasoning persuasive and thus held that the "gross receipts"
version of "proceeds" in the money laundering statute was the most appropriate.
The court also dismissed the "merger problem" addressed by Scialabba,determining that the gambling operation 8and
money laundering charges "each re2
quir[e] an element the other does not.
Following the Iacaboni decision, the Third Circuit addressed the
"proceeds" issue more directly in United States v. Grasso.83 This court also
construed the use of "proceeds" in Section 1956 to mean "gross receipts" rather
than "profits., 84 The defendant in Grasso had been convicted of money laundering based on his fraud scheme's advertising, printing, and mailing expenses:
"simply put, [he] paid for his business expenses with the receipts from his
sales."85 Presented with "the many definitions of proceeds and the uncertain
value of congressional records in choosing among them," the Grasso court
looked to the statute itself and decided that the language in Section 1956 that
criminalized a financial transaction for the purpose of "promoting" an underlying offense indicated that the reinvestment of an unlawful operation's
gross in86
come to sustain itself should be punishable under the statute.
Acknowledging the difficulties of proof involved in a money laundering
prosecution under the "profits" definition,8 7 the court dismissed the "merger
problem," noting previous circuit precedent that indicated that "[Section] 1956
may subject an individual to multiple penalties based on the same crime without
violating either double jeopardy or the principles governing statutory interpretation."8 8 The decision explicitly stated that Scialabba reached an "incorrect re80

81
82
83
84
85

86
87
88

Id. at4.
Id. at 4 (citing United States v. Hurley. 63 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 1995)).
Id. at 6 n.8.
381 F.3d 160, 167 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 168-69.
Id. at 169 n.13.
Id. at 169. A fuller excerpt of this analysis is helpful:
In United States v. Conley. 37 F.3d 970. 978 79 (3d Cir.1994). we held that

prosecution for both gambling and money laundering did not implicate double
jeopardy because the statutory elements of the offenses differ; an individual is
guilty of money laundering only if he or she intended to conceal or promote
unlawful activity. The Seventh Circuit distinguished our decision in Conley,
suggesting that if "proceeds" is interpreted broadly, the similarity between
money laundering and the underlying criminal activity is problematic as a
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suit" and thus upheld the defendant's conviction on the basis of the "gross receipts" definition of "proceeds." 8 9
Finally, adding heft rather than analysis to the growing debate, the
Eighth Circuit in United States v. Huber90 adopted the First Circuit's holding in
Grasso without comment. 91 The issue of "profit" vs. "gross receipts" thus became ripe for the Supreme Court's review.

Iii. THE SANTOS DECISION
This section of the Note analyzes and describes in detail the Santos decision. While the Supreme Court presumably granted certiorari in this case in
order to soothe the growing divide in the United States courts of appeals on the
issue of a "profits" vs. "gross receipts" definition of "proceeds" in Section 1956,
the decision ultimately released by the plurality has caused a great deal of confusion among the lower courts.
A.

Background

In 1997, Efrain Santos was convicted for his role in the operation of an
92
illegal gambling business - known as a "bolita" - in East Chicago, Indiana.
Santos' bolita involved using portions of the gamblers' bets to both pay his employees (including his co-defendant, Benedicto Diaz) and compensate the bettors. 93 Based on these payments, Santos was convicted on two counts of violating Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Money Laundering Control Act, among oth94
er crimes.
On his direct appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Santos' argument focused
on the "promot[ional]" language in the Section 1956. He argued that "his transactions merely completed the substantive offense of illegal gambling, and did
not 'promote the carrying on' of the bolita," as is required to violate Section
matter of statutory construction. But our Court has resolved the latter issue as
well. In United States v. Omoruyi. 260 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir.2001). we recognized that "conduct constituting the underlying offense conduct may overlap with the conduct constituting money laundering." An individual may be
convicted for money laundering as long as the financial transactions are conducted with proceeds of the illegal transaction and with the intent to promote
the underlying offense.

Id.
89

90
91

92

Grasso, 381 F.3d at 167.
404 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1058.
Santos v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004).

93
94

United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2022 23 (2008) (plurality opinion).
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)). Santos was also convicted of one count of conspiracy to run an illegal gambling business, one count of running an illegal gambling business, and
one count of conspiracy to launder money. See supra notes 18 21 and accompanying text.
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1956(a)(1)(A)(i).9 5 The court rejected Santos's argument and affirmed his con96
viction, reasoning that "promotion" included transactions that merely promote
the "continued prosperity of the underlying offense." 9' Santos then filed for a
writ of certiorari, but the Supreme Court declined review. 98
After exhausting his direct appeals, Santos filed a habeas motion under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 collaterally attacking his money laundering convictions.99
Santos alleged that the Seventh Circuit's Scialabbaloo decision, which was decided subsequent to his final judgment, required that his money laundering conviction and his conspiracy to commit money laundering conviction be set aside
and that he be resentenced.' 0 1
The district court agreed that Santos was entitled to the benefit of the
Scialabba court's interpretation of "proceeds," 1 0 2 concluding that "there exists a
distinct possibility that Santos stands convicted of acts the law does not make
criminal."' 1 3 The district court thus granted Santos' § 2255 motion, vacated his4
money laundering convictions, and remanded his case for resentencing.1
The government sensed an opportunity to overturn Scialabbain light of the
intervening circuit decisions that had disagreed with its reasoning. 0 5 On appeal,
however, the Seventh Circuit noted that "only Congress or the Supreme Court
can definitely resolve the debate of this ambiguous term,"1 0 6 and upheld Scia-

95

United States v. Febus, 218 F.3d 784, 789 (7th Cir. 2000).

96

Id. at 790.

97

Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991)).

98

Santos v. United States, 531 U.S. 1021 (2000) (cert denied).

See United States v. Santos, 342 F. Supp. 2d 781 (N.D. Ind. 2004). There were three other
grounds alleged in his § 2255 petition for relief, but the Scialabba argument was found to be the
only meritorious one.
10o 282 F.3d 475 (2002).
101 Santos, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 799.
102 Id. at 797.
103 Id. at 798 99.
99

104

Id.
In order for Santos to be guilty of money laundering under [the "profits" definition], the money used by Santos in the financial transactions between himself and his couriers and/or winners for purposes of promoting his illegal
gambling business must have been derived from the net proceeds of his illegal
gambling business ... the constitution of those proceeds (net versus gross)
was never determined ....
[l]t clearly appears the proceeds admittedly used
by Santos to pay winners and couriers could only have been gross
proceeds....

Id. (emphasis in original).
105 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
106 Santos v. United States, 461 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2006) (footnote omitted) (alteration in
original).
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labba and the grant of Santos' § 2255 motion vacating his money laundering
convictions. 10 7 On April 23, 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.10 8
B.

The Supreme Court's Obfuscation

In a fractured 4 1-4 split, the Supreme Court proceeded to muddle the
definition of "proceeds" in Section 1956(a)(1) even further. Justice Scalia, writing for a four-Justice plurality, advocated a "profits" definition for all predicate
offenses. 0 9 Justice Stevens, writing a sole concurrence that provided the crucial
fifth vote for the plurality, held that the Court need not pick a definition of
"proceeds" applicable to every predicate offense and that the "profits" definition
was at least appropriate for the predicate offense of operating an illegal gambling business.' 10Justice Alito, writing for the four Justices in the primary dissent, argued that the "gross receipts" definition should apply to all predicate
offenses.''' This Part proceeds to examine each of these arguments in detail.
1.

The Plurality
a.

An Ambiguous Term

Justice Scalia authored the plurality opinion, joined by Justice Souter
and Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Thomas joined all but the final section of the
opinion. The main thrust of the plurality's argument was essentially a routine
utilization of the ordinary principles of statutory construction. First, Justice
Scalia noted the lack of a statutory definition of "proceeds" in Section 1956. 12
Second,
Justice Scalia found that attempting to give the term its "ordinary meaning" 13 was futile, as both "gross receipts" and "profits" are ordinarily used and
accepted definitions of "proceeds."'" ' Third, Justice Scalia looked to the common meaning of "proceeds" in the Federal Criminal Code, noting that while the
107

Id.

108

United States v. Santos, 127 S. Ct. 2098 (2007).

109

Justice Scalia was joined by Justice Souter, Justice Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg for Parts

I II and V of his opinion. United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2023 31 (2008) (plurality
opinion). Part IV was only joined by Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg. Id.at 2030-31.

110

See id. at 2031 34 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)

III

Justice Alito was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer. Id.
at 2035-45 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also filed a brief dissent. Id. at 2034-35 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
112

Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2024 (plurality opinion).

H,

Id. at 2024 (citing Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179. 187 (1995)).

114 Id.(citing OXFORD ENGLISH LANGUAGE DICTIONARY 544 (2d ed. 1989) and WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1972 (2d ed. 1957)). Justice Scalia rejected the government's argu-

ment that the "gross receipts" operates as the primary definition, noting that "any preference [given by secondary sources] is too slight for us to conclude that *[gross] receipts' is the primary
meaning of 'proceeds."' Id.
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term was largely left undefined,' 1 5 the provisions that had defined "proceeds"
included both the "gross receipts" and the "profits" definitions,' 16 and as such,
there was no common statutory meaning of the term. Finally, the plurality considered the term "proceeds" contextually within Section 1956 itself,'" noting
that all appearances of the term "leave the ambiguity intact"118 and arguing that
the statute made sense under either definition.1 19
120
Finding the legislative history of the statute "totally unenlightening,',
Justice Scalia finally concluded that "there is no more reason to think that
'proceeds' means '[gross] receipts' than there is to think that 'proceeds' means
'profits.", '2

1

Section 1956's use of "proceeds," as described by the plurality,

was helplessly ambiguous.
b.

The Role of the Rule of Lenity

In an interesting move, 22 Justice Scalia then proceeded to use to the
rule of lenity to break the tie between the two competing interpretations. Concluding that "the 'profits' definition of 'proceeds' is always more defendantfriendly than the 'receipts' definition," he insisted that the narrower definition
was the proper one, declaring that "[t]he rule of lenity requires ambiguous
crim1 23
inal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.

115 Id. at 2024 (noting that "proceeds" is undefined in 18 U.S.C. § 1963 and 21 U.S.C. § 853).
Id. (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(e)(3) (2000) and 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2000) both define the

116

term to mean receipts. but 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)(B) (2000) defines the term to include "profits").
117 Id. (citing United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S.
365 (1988)).
18 Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2024 (plurality opinion).
119 Id. The plurality also dismissed Justice Alito's point that "14 states that use and define the
Iproceeds' in their money laundering statutes, the Model Money Laundering Act, and an international treaty on the subject, all define the term to include gross receipts," noting that "[m]ost of the
state laws cited by the dissent, the Model Act, and the treaty postdate the 1986 federal moneylaundering statute by several years... [i]f anything, they show that "proceeds" is ambiguous and
that others ... sought to clarify the ambiguity." Id. at 2024-25 (citations omitted, footnote omitted).
120 Id. at 2025 n.3.
121

Id. at 2025.

122

See Harvard Law Review Ass'n, supra note 73, at 477-84. This Article notes that before

Santos, the rule of lenity was becoming "increasingly limited, both in scope and application" and
hypothesizes that the Court's willingness to use the rule of lenity in this instance "indicate[s] that
judges should not be as reluctant to reach ambiguity, or to use lenity as the primary reason for the
decision, as they have been in the past few decades." Id. at 482. Indeed, the number of cases citing
Santos for its discussion of the rule of lenity are growing in number every day. See, e.g.. United
States v. Miranda Lopez, 532 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (taking note of Santos and applying
the rule of lenity to an ambiguous statute).
123 Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2025 (plurality opinion).
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The Merger Problem

Justice Scalia also addressed the "merger problem" that had so troubled
the Seventh Circuit in both Scialabba and Santos.124 He argued that, under the
"gross receipts" definition, "nearly every violation of the illegal lottery statute
would also be a violation of the money-laundering statute because paying a
winning bettor is a transaction involving receipts that the defendant intends to
promote the carrying on of the lottery."' 125 As presumably few lotteries would
make the dubious economic move of refusing to pay their
winners, Section 1956
"merges" with the statute criminalizing illegal lotteries. 126
The plurality expressed concern over the extreme sentencing disparity
created by Santos' particular merger.127 The statutory maximum sentence for a
violation of the illegal lottery statute is five years, but as a result of the aforementioned "merger" with the money laundering statute, defendants face an extra
fifteen years added to their statutory maximum for the same activities.121 Justice
Scalia also warned that this phenomenon was not limited to the illegal gambling
29
operations, as many white-collar crimes involve similar business-like costs.
As "profits" are the funds that are left over after the expenses of the predicate
offense are paid, the plurality argued that this narrowed interpretation of
"proceeds" would eliminate the double liability for payments that are a neces0
sary part of the predicate offense.13
d.

Problems of Proof and Accounting

Justice Scalia also addressed perhaps the most practical concern of the
government: the problems of proof and accounting that would emerge from the
narrowed definition of "proceeds." The government's argument was essentially
that, as prosecutors had to prove (1) that a transaction "in fact involves the
proceeds" of a SUA as well as (2) the defendant's knowledge that the property
involved in the transaction "represents the proceeds" of a SUA,131 the utilization
of the "profits" definition would require proof that is much more difficult to

obtain. 132
The plurality dismissed this argument with the rule of lenity, dryly stating that "[w]e interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of defendants, not
124 See discussion supra Part 1I.B. 1.
125 Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2026 (plurality opinion).
126

Id.

127

See discussion supra Part II.A.

128

Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2026 (plurality opinion); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2000).

129 Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2026 (plurality opinion).
130 Id. at 2027.

Id. at 2023 n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)).
132 Id. at 2028: see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15 18, Santos, U.S. (No. 06-1005).
131
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' 33
prosecutors"'
and noting that several other criminal statutes required proof of
134
"profits.'
To provide some direction in proving the elements of a Section
1956 offense using "profits," the plurality advocated a "single instance test":

To establish the proceeds element under the "profits" interpretation, the prosecution needs to show only that a single instance
of specified unlawful activity was (1) profitable and (2) gave
rise to the money involved in a charged transaction. Government can select the instances in which profitability is the

strongest. 135
e.

Stare Decisis

Justice Scalia concluded the plurality's opinion with a final section devoted entirely to attacking Justice Stevens' limiting concurrence. 136 Justice Stevens' opinion advocates interpreting "proceeds" to mean "profits" for some
predicate crimes (such as an illegal gambling offense) and "gross receipts" for
others, 137 a prospect that Justice Scalia evidently found unpalatable. This section of the plurality's opinion lost the support of Justice Thomas; thus, only Justices Souter and Ginsburg concurred with Justice Scalia's strong rebuke.
Justice Scalia forcefully argued that Justice Stevens' attempt to "giv[e]
the same word, in the same statutory provision, different meanings in different
factual contexts"'138 was explicitly rejected by Supreme Court precedent, citing
Clark v. Martinez for the proposition that "the
meaning of words in a statute
1 39
cannot change with the statute's application.
While acknowledging that, as the deciding vote, the concurrence officially limited the plurality's opinion, Justice Scalia added:
The narrowness of [Justice Stevens' holding] consists of finding
"proceeds" means "profits" when there is no legislative history
to the contrary. That is all our judgment holds. It does not hold
that the outcome is different when a contrary legislative history
does exist. Justice Stevens' speculations on that point address a

133
134

Santos,128 S. Ct. at 2028 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2028 (noting that both 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) require a determi-

nation of "gross profits or other proceeds").
135

Id. at 2029.

136

Id. at 2030 31.

137

See discussion infra Part I1I.B.2.

138

Santos,128 S. Ct. at 2030 (plurality opinion).

139

Id. at 2030 (citing Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 379 (2005)).
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case that is not before 1him,
are the purest of dicta, and form no
40
holding.
today's
of
part
Justice Scalia then finished his opinion with a flourish, sending out a warning to
counsel advocating Justice Stevens' narrowed position: "[n]ot only do the Justices joining this opinion reject [Justice Stevens']
view, but also (apparently) so
1 41
do the justices joining the principal dissent.
2.

Justice Stevens' Key Concurrence

As the fifth vote, Justice Stevens' narrower concurring opinion limited
the Court's holding.1 42 Noting the lack of legislative history regarding the
.'proceeds" of an illegal gambling business and arguing that the application of
the "receipts" definition to this particular predicate offense would lead to a
"perverse result," Justice Stevens agreed with the plurality's holding that
"proceeds" means "profits" in the context of an illegal gambling business. 4 3
Justice Stevens argued that the term "proceeds" could have different definitions, meaning either "profits" or "gross receipts," when applied to each of
the varied predicate offenses for money laundering. 44 Noting that "although it
did not do so, it seems clear that Congress could have provided that the term
'proceeds' shall have one meaning when referring to some specified unlawful
activities and a different meaning when referring to others,"1 45 he found no reason why a court should not be able to make the same interpretational leap. 46
Justice Stevens also voiced concern about the "merger" problem, noting that the
treatment of a "mere payment of expense of operating an illegal gambling business" as a separate money laundering charge was the equivalent of a double

140

Id. at 2031.

141 Id. (citing id. at 2036. 2044 (Alito. J.. dissenting)).

See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
143 Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2033-34 (Stevens, J., concurring).
142

144 Id. at 2034. n.7.

145 Id. at 2032. Justice Stevens noted that the Congress had done precisely this in the general
civil forfeiture statute, § 981:
In ... § 981, Congress did provide two different definitions of"proceeds," recognizing that - for a subset of activities - "proceeds" must allow for the
deduction of costs. Compare §981(a)(2)(A)(2000 ed.) (defining "proceeds in

cases involving illegal goods and services to mean 'property of any kind obtained directly or indirectly . . . not limited to the net gain or profit realized
from the offense") with § 981(a)(2)(B) (defining 'proceeds' with respect to

lawful goods sold in an illegal manner as the amount of money acquired 'less
the direct costs incurred in providing the goods or services').
Id. at 2031 32.
146

Id. at 2032.
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jeopardy violation. 14' At least for illegal gambling offenses, Stevens held the
rule of lenity could not allow such a "perverse result." 148
However, in a key point, Justice Stevens agreed with dissenting Justice
Alito's argument that "the legislative history of Section 1956 makes it clear that
Congress intended the term 'proceeds' to include gross revenues from the sale
of contraband and the operation of organized crime syndicates involving such
sales."' 149 Thus, Justice Alito's argument that "proceeds" is intended to mean
"gross receipts" in the context of Section 1956 for drug sales and organized
crime, 5 the "heartland" activities prohibited by the statute,'
garnered five
votes.' 1
Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice Scalia's characterization of the
stare decisis effect of the opinion, arguing that his "conclusion rests on [his]
conviction that Congress could not have intended the perverse result that the
dissent's rule would produce if its definition were applied to the operation of an
unlicensed gambling business." 152 Where other applications of the statute do
not result in such a "perverse result," Justice Stevens "would presume that the
legislative history summarized by Justice Alito reflects the intent of the enacting
Congress. 153
3.

Justice Alito's Principal Dissent

Justice Alito authored the principal dissent, joined by the Chief Justice,
Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer. 154 The dissent found that the plurality's
147

Id. at 2033.

148

Id.

149

Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2032 (Stevens. J.. concurring).

150

See id. at 2039-40 (Alito, J., dissenting):

The federal money laundering statute was enacted in the wake of an influential report by the President's Commission on Organized Crime that focused
squarely on criminal enterprises of this type. See Interim Report 7-8 (described in S. Rep. No. 99-433, pp. 2-4 (1986) (hereinafter S. Rep.) and H.R.

Rep., at 16). The Commission identified drug traffickers and other organized
criminal groups as presenting the most serious problems .... Following the issuance of the Interim Report. Congress turned its attention to the problem of
money laundering, and much of the discussion focused on the need to prevent
laundering by drug and organized crime syndicates. See, e.g., S. Rep., at 3 [],
4 ("Money laundering is a crucial financial underpinning of organized crime
and narcotics trafficking" []).
151 See id. at 2032, 2035 n.1.

Id. at 2034 n.7 (Stevens. J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Id. Briefly, Justice Stevens also claimed that Clark v. Martinez did not preclude his argument because of the "compelling reasons" in Santos to have oscillating statutory definitions. Id. at
2032.
154
Justice Breyer, who also joined Justice Alito's dissent, filed a brief dissent in which he
152
153

primarily focused on the "merger problem" discussed supra. Instead of changing the definition of
"proceeds" as advocated by the plurality to correct the problem, Justice Breyer suggested that, as
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interpretation "[1] frustrated Congress' intent and [2] maim[ed] a statute that
was enacted as an important defense against organized criminal enterprises,"
particularly organized crime and drug trafficking. 55 In contrast to both the plurality and Justice Stevens, the four dissenters wished to define "proceeds" as
"gross receipts" for all predicate offenses.
a.

An Ambiguous Term

The dissent, paralleling Justice Scalia's textual analysis of the term
"proceeds," argued that the plurality had not focused enough attention on the
term's location in the context of a money laundering statute and had thus inappropriately resorted to the rule of lenity. 156 Citing an international treaty, 157 the
Model Money Laundering Act, 158 and several state statutes 159 that all define
"proceeds" in a way that encompasses "gross receipts," the dissent argued that
this trend indicated that such160laws "customarily mean for the term to reach all
receipts and not just profits."'
161
JusFar from finding the legislative history "totally unenlightening,,
tice Alito made much of the fact that the original version of the money laundering statute passed by the House included the term "criminally derived property,"
a phrase commonly understood to include gross receipts. 162 The bill passed by
164
the Senate simply said "proceeds," 163 and the House acceded to that version.
Justice Alito argued that "there is no suggestion in the legislative history that the
term 'criminally deprived property' and the term 'proceeds' were perceived as
having different meanings. ' 65 As he found the statute to have "reasonable

the problem was "essentially a problem of fairness in sentencing," the Sentencing Commission
should address it. Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2034 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
155
Id. at 2036 (Alito. J.. dissenting).
156
Id. at 2036-37.
157
Id.at 2036 (noting that the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime defines "proceeds" to mean "any property derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly,
through the commission of an offense").
158
Id. at 2036 (noting that the Model Money Laundering Act defines "proceeds" as "property
acquired or derived directly or indirectly from, produced through. realized through. or caused by
an act or omission...
159

Id.

160

Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2037 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2025 n.3 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2037 (Alito. J.. dissenting).

161
162

164

S. 2683, 99th Cong. § 2(a) (1986).
H.R. 5484. 99th Cong. (1986).

165

Santos,128 S. Ct. at 2037 n.5 (Alito, J., dissenting). But see id at 2025 n.3 (plurality opi-

163

nion) (Justice Scalia was extremely critical of this position, because "we have no idea why the
earlier House terminology was rejected
because "proceeds" captured the same meaning. or
because "proceeds" captured a narrower meaning?").
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clarity" in light of this legislative history, Justice Alito held that the rule of leni166
ty was inapplicable.
b.

The "Merger Problem"

Though acknowledging the severity of the "merger problem" as de167
scribed
by
theremedied
dissent argued
it was limited
to a select
1 68 plurality,
1 69 number of casesthe
and should be
by the that
Sentencing
Commission.
c.

Problems of Proof and Accounting

The primary concern of the dissent rested on the "pointless and difficult
problems of proof' 1 70 involved in proving the statutory elements of Section
1956 under a "profits" definition.' 7 ' Justice Alito argued that knowledge of
"profits" would be exceedingly hard to prove in the case of a professional money launderer1 72 and that special accounting rules would have to be developed to
73
discern the profitability of the often murky world of criminal enterprises.
Justice Alito primarily focused on drug sales and organized crime, arguing that
"[t]racing funds back to particular drug sales and proving that these sales were
profitable will often prove impossible. 17 4 He then stressed that these problems
were not limited to organized crime and contraband, but would also extend to
the white-collar crimes, such
as fraud, that are routinely prosecuted under the
175
money laundering statute.
d.

Stare Decisis

The dissent explicitly disagreed with Justice Stevens' concurrence; Justice Alito explained, "I do not see how the meaning of the term 'proceeds' can
vary depending on the nature of the illegal activity that produced the laundered
funds."' 17 6 The dissent was cheered, however, by Justice Stevens' agreement
166 Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2045 (Alito, J., dissenting).
167
168

Id. at 2044.
Id.

169 Id.The dissent also claimed that the "merger problem" was exacerbated by the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation of the "promotion[al]" language of Section 1956, which was not up for

review. See discussion supraPart lI.B. 1.
170 Id. at 2038.
171

Id.

172 Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2039 (Alito, J., dissenting).

173 Id. at 2040.
174 Id. (citing United States v. Bajackajian, 524 U.S. 321, 351 52 (1998)).
175
Id.at 2043.
176 Id. at 2044.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss3/14

22

Zimarowski: Taking a Gamble: Money Laundering after United States v. Santos
2010]

TAKING A GAMBLE

that proceeds included "gross revenues from the sale of contraband and the operation of organized crime syndicates involving such sales., 177 In a pointed
message, the dissent noted that "five
justices agree with the [aforementioned]
78
position taken by Justice Stevens."'
IV. MONEY LAUNDERING AFTER SANTOS:

A STATE OF FLUX

Since Santos was released,1 79 courts throughout the country have been
trying to make sense of the fractured decision, particularly the heated debate
concerning its precedential value. The law at this point is still developing, but
the post-Santos decisions concerning the application of the "profits" definition
to predicate offenses other than gambling can be grouped into roughly three
categories. This Part analyzes the current decisions on this issue and classifies
them as Narrow, Moderate, or Broad Santos courts. Narrow Santos courts have
restricted the application of the "profits" definition to gambling, Moderate Santos courts have expanded the "profits" definition to some predicate offenses but
not to others, and Broad Santos courts have to date applied the "profits" definition to all Section 1956 predicate offenses. After describing the different categories, this Part takes a critical look at the Narrow and Moderate Santos positions and advocates for an adoption of the Broad Santos position.
A.

Narrow Santos: A Critical View

Thus far, both the Fourth Circuit s ° in an unpublished opinion, 8' and
the Eleventh Circuit'8 2 Courts of Appeals are joined by several district courts8 3
177 Id. at 2032 (Stevens, J., concurring).
178 Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2036 n.1 (Alito, J., dissenting).
179 This decision came down on June 2, 2008.
180 United States v. Howard, 309 Fed. App'x. 760, 771 (4th Cir. 2009) ("Because Santos does
not establish a binding precedent that the term 'proceeds' means 4profits,' except regarding an
illegal gambling charge, we are bound by this Court's precedent establishing that 'proceeds'
means 'receipts."').
181 Unpublished decisions in the Fourth Circuit have extremely limited precedential value. See
Local Rules of the Fourth Circuit Rule 32.1 ("Citation of this Court's unpublished dispositions
issued prior to January 1, 2007. in briefs and oral arguments in this Court and in the district courts
within this Circuit is disfavored, except for the purpose of establishing res judicata. estoppel, or
the law of the case."). Regardless, as the Howard decision is the only Fourth Circuit opinion addressing the Santos problem, the lower courts in this district have almost uniformly fallen in line.
See, e.g., King v. United States, No. 6:08-cv-01260, 2009 WL 4884362, at *4 (S.D.W.Va. Dec.
10, 2009). There is, however, one notable exception to this rule; a district court in Virginia has
resoundingly rejected the Howard court's reasoning and adopted a moderate Santos position. See
United States v. Smith, 623 F. Supp. 2d 693, 702 (W.D.Va. 2009).
Th[is] court believes that Santos stands for the proposition that, as a matter of
law, the revenue generated by a specified unlawful activity used in a financial
transaction to pay the essential expenses of operating that same illegal business cannot constitute 'proceeds' under the money laundering statute, if the
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in an extremely constricted view of the Santos decision, and as such this Note
characterizes them as "Narrow Santos" courts. These courts have limited the
application of the "profits" definition in section 1956(a)(1) solely to the predicate offense of unlawful gambling operations. This Part explains the two separate rationales that underlie the Narrow Santos courts' decisions and provides
criticism for their positions.
1.

The Marks Rule

The Narrow Santos courts generally rely on a time-tested principle of
stare decisis: when the Supreme Court is fractured such that "no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices," the Court's holding is
limited to the narrowest concurrence (the "Marks rule"). 1 4 Even Justice Scalia
noted that "[s]ince [Justice Stevens'] vote is necessary to our judgment, and
penalties for money laundering are substantially more severe than those for
the underlying specified unlawful activity.
Id.
182 United States v. Demarest, 570 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir. 2009) ("Santos has limited precedential value.... [t]he narrow holding in Santos, at most, was that the gross receipts of an unlicensed gambling operation were not 'proceeds' under section 1956 ....
").
183 See, e.g., Acosta v. United States, --- F.Supp.2d

-.-.,

2009 WL 5245634, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

Dec. 31, 2009) ("The proceeds from Acosta's money laundering activities derived from illegal
narcotics, not gambling, such as was the case in Santos. Circuit Courts which have addressed the
issue have narrowed Santos to its facts and have drawn this distinction."); Marrero v. United
States, --- F.Supp.2d

----

2009 WL 3179612. at *8 (S.D.Fla. 2009) ("The definition of proceeds in

Santos must therefore be interpreted to mean profits only where the underlying transactions involve the operation of an illegal gambling business."); United States v. Darui, 614 F.Supp.2d 25,
28 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that "itappears that when Justice Scalia's and Justice Stevens' opinions
are read together, Santos defines 'proceeds' as 'profits' only in the context of the illegal gambling
operation."); United States v. Sims, Nos. H-98-169, 08-3135, 2009 WL 1158847, at *3 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 29 2009) ("[Santos] should only be viewed as standing for the proposition that the 'proceeds'
of an illegal gambling operation must, for purposes of the money laundering statute, be profits, not
merely receipts."): United States v. Peters, 257 F.R.D. 377, 388 (W.D.N.Y. March 19, 2009)
("[Santos] must be read as limited to its facts ....");Gotti v. United States, No. 08-CV-2664
(FB).2009 WL 197132, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28. 2009) (holding that Santos is limited to its facts
and "stands only for the proposition that the money laundering statute does not make criminal the
use of the revenue from an illegal gambling operation to pay for the expenses involved in running
the operation"); Bull v. United States, Nos. CV 08-4191 CAS, CR 04-402 CAS, 2008 WL
5103227, at *7 (C.D. Cal Dec. 3, 2008) (holding in a section 2255 habeas proceeding for money
laundering predicated on the offense of drug distribution that Santos is limited to its facts); United
States v. Prince, No. 04-20223-JPM. 2008 WL 4861296. at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 7, 2008) ("This
Court continues to apply the *[gross] receipts' definition of 'proceeds' in cases like this one, in
which the specified unlawful activity is health care fraud."); United States v. Orosco, 575
F.Supp.2d 1214. 1218 (D.Colo. 2008) (holding Santos limited to its facts and finding "that Santos
left Tenth Circuit law pertaining to the proper interpretation of 'proceeds' in the federal money
laundering statute undisturbed at least when the underlying SUA is some act other than illegal
gambling," then finding no Tenth Circuit case law on the issue and reserving judgment).
184 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
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since his opinion rests upon the narrower ground, the Court's holding is limited
accordingly." ' 8 5 Ironically enough, this means that Justice Stevens' position,
explicitly rejected by seven 8members
of the Court and joined by no one, could
6
become the rule of the land.1
Both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly used the Marks
rule to justify their limited take on Santos. The Fourth Circuit noted,
[T]he holding of the [Supreme] Court for precedential purposes
is the narrowest holding that garnered five votes. Justice Stevens's concurrence provides the narrowest holding. Justice
Stevens writes that the 'profits' definition of 'proceeds' is limited to money laundering 18cases
involving a gambling opera7
tion like the one in that case.
Following suit, the Eleventh Circuit cited Marks while arguing that "[t]he narrow [Marks] holding in Santos, at most, was that the gross receipts of an unlicensed gambling operation were not 'proceeds . . ."' and went on to hold that
the Santos plurality's "profits" definition did not apply to laundering the
proceeds of drug trafficking.'
Both of these decisions thus retained circuit
precedent regarding the definition of "proceeds" as "gross receipts" for predicate offenses other than illegal gambling.18 9
There is, however, a major problem with the approach taken in these
cases: Justice Stevens did not simply hold that "proceeds" means "profits" for
the predicate offense of operating an illegal gambling business. To the contrary,
185 United States v. Santos, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2031 (2008) (plurality opinion) (citing AMarks, 430

U.S. at 193).
186 Seven members of the Court explicitly rejected that the meaning of the term "proceeds"
could vary based on the factual context of the offense. See id at 2030 (plurality opinion) (Justice
Scalia, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, cites Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005), for
the proposition that "the meaning of words in a statute cannot change with the statute's application."); see also id. at 2035 36 (Alito. J.. dissenting) (Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices Kennedy and Breyer, notes that "Icannot agree with Justice Stevens' approach insofar as
it holds that the meaning of the term 'proceeds' varies depending on the nature of the illegal activity that produces the laundered funds.").
187 United States v. Howard, 309 Fed. App'x. 760, 771 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).
188 United States v. Demarest, 570 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11 th Cir. 2009).
189
See Howard, 309 Fed. App'x. at 771 ("Because Santos does not establish a binding
precedent that the term 'proceeds' means 'profits.' except regarding an illegal gambling charge,
we are bound by this Court's precedent establishing that 'proceeds' means 'receipts.'"). Additionally, as the Eleventh Circuit in Demarest essentially limited the Santos decision to its facts, district
courts in that circuit have been using the prior "gross receipts" definition for SUAs including
Medicare fraud and unlawful distribution of controlled substances. See Arnaiz v. Hickey, No.
CV208-97, 2009 WL 2971638, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Sep 16, 2009) (Medicare fraud); United States v.
Kelley. No. 08-00327-CG. 2009 WL 2382752, at *4 (S.D.Ala. July 29, 2009) (distribution of

controlled substances).
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he argued that rule of lenity applied to section 1956 when the "merger problem"
created a "perverse result" that Congress "could not have intended," such as in
the case of an illegal gambling operation. 90 In "other applications of the statute
not involving such a perverse result," he assumed that the legislative history
indicated that the "gross receipts" definition should be used.1 91 Thus, it seems
that a court truly accepting the Marks rule, and Justice Stevens' approach,
would have to apply something akin to an ad hoc "perverse results" test for separate predicate offenses, one that takes into account the "merger problem" as
well as any relevant legislative history - 92 a complication that the Moderate Santos courts are currently struggling with.
2.

The Marks Rule Rejected: Alcan Aluminum Corp.

Perhaps in an attempt to avoid the thorny issue of Justice Stevens' "perverse results" test, several other Narrow Santos courts have added another step
to their stare decisis analysis.193 These courts look to the interpretive principles
194
espoused in the Second Circuit case United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.
and its progeny for the proposition that the Marks rule becomes inapplicable
when the narrowest concurring opinion explicitly rejects the plurality's reasoning and does not represent a "common denominator [of] the position approved
by at least five justices. ' 195 In such a case, there is no "law of the land" and the
decision is limited to its facts. 196 These courts argue that Justice Scalia's plurality and Justice Stevens' concurrence used divergent reasoning, and as such, the
Santos holding is limited to the specific, fact-based result of defining "proceeds"
as "profits" for the predicate offense of operating an illegal gambling busi-

190

United States v. Santos, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2033 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Id. at 2034 n.7 (emphasis added). Specifically, Justice Stevens mentioned that there was no
elucidating legislative history for the predicate offense section 541 "Entry of False Goods Classified." Id. at 2032.
192
See discussion of Moderate Santos cases infra Part IV.B.
193
See, e.g.. Davis v. Grondolsky, No. 09-2882 (RMB), 2010 WL 503026, at *6 n.5 (D.N.J.
2010): Marrero v. United States, --- F. Supp. 2d -.-. 2009 WL 3179612, at *8 (S.D.Fla. 2009);
Wooten v. Cauley, No. 09-CV-67-HRW, 2009 WL 3834093, at *6 (E.D.Ky. Nov. 16, 2009);
Gamboa v. Norwood, No. CV 09-0656-DSF(RC), 2009 WL 482304, at *3 n.4 (C.D.Cal. Feb. 23,
2009); Gotti v. United States, No. 08-CV-2664 (FB), 2009 WL 197132, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan 28,
2009); Bull v. United States, Nos. CV 08-4191 CAS, CR 04-402 CAS, 2008 WL 5103227, at *7
(C.D. Cal Dec. 03. 2008); United States v. Orosco, 575 F.Supp.2d 1214, 1215 (D.Colo. 2008).
194
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2003). Although Alcan
Aluminum Corp. seems to be the most cited case by post-Santos courts on this issue, the principles
contained in that case have originated elsewhere. See, e.g., Anker Energy Corp. v. Consol. Coal
191

Co., 177 F.3d 161, 169-170 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing cases).
195
Alcan Aluminum Corp. 315 F.3d at 189 (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781

(D.C.Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
196

Id.
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ness.197 Accordingly, these courts hold that their individual circuit precedent on
the "proceeds" issue applies for every other predicate offense.
Unfortunately, this approach also gives rise to serious problems. These
courts are stretching the principles of Alcan Aluminum Corp. almost indistinguishably in their attempts to avoid a broader application of Santos. In Alcan
itself, for example, the Second Circuit analyzed the stare decisis effect of the
Supreme Court case Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,' a plurality decision that
declared a statute unconstitutional. In that case, four justices voted to strike
down the statute using a Takings Clause analysis.1 99 The necessary fifth justice
specifically rejected the use of the Takings Clause, instead declaring the statute
unconstitutional under substantive due process.2 00 Thus, the Second Circuit
found that the "substantive due process reasoning ... is not a logical subset of
the plurality's Takings analysis, [and] no 'common denominator' can be said to
exist among the Court's opinions. 2 0 '
The situation in Santos is nowhere near so clean-cut. Far from following a completely different doctrine or explicitly rejecting the plurality, Justice
Stevens plainly stated that he found the plurality's determination of the applicability of the rule of lenity in the gambling context "surely persuasive," and he
also engaged in a lengthy analysis of the "merger problem," even writing that
the plurality's "merger" analysis
"dovetails with what common sense and the
20 2
require.,
would
lenity
of
rule
Essentially, Justice Stevens' opinion relied on (1) the lack of legislative
history elucidating the definition of the ambiguous term "proceeds" for the pre203
dicate offense of operating an unlicensed gambling business,
(2) the "merger
problem" and the "perverse result" that would occur if the money laundering
charges stemming from the gambling convictions were allowed to stand,20 4 and
(3) the application of the rule of lenity to avoid that perverse result.20 Justice
Scalia's plurality decision essentially follows the exact same pattern, but finds
the legislative history "unenlightening" for all predicate offenses, not just gambling, and argues that only one definition of "proceeds" can stand,20 6 thus apply197

Davis, 2010 WL 503026, at *6 n.5 (using Alean Aluminum Corp. to limit Santos to its

facts): Marrero, 2009 WL 3179612, at *8 (same); Wooten. 2009 WL 3834093, at *6 (same);
Gamboa, 2009 WL 482304, at *3 n.4 (same); Gotti, 2009 WL 197132, at *3 (same); Bull, 2008
WL 5103227 at *7, (same); Orosco, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 1215 (same).
198
524 U.S. 498 (1998).
199
Id. at 537.
200
Id. at 539, 550.
201
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis add-

ed).
202
203
204

205
206

United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 2032.

Id. at 2033.
Id. at 2033-34.
Id. at 2030 (plurality opinion).
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ing the rule of lenity more expansively than Justice Stevens. 20 ' This, however,
does not change the fact that Stevens' opinion is "a logical subset" of the plurality decision, as it uses an extremely similar chain of reasoning and ends up embracing precisely the ideas that the plurality puts forward, albeit more narrowly. 20 8 Therefore, the reliance on the principles of Apfel by these courts is misplaced.
3.

The Clark v. Martinez Problem

Finally, even if the Narrow Santos courts' analysis relying on Apfel and
the Marks rule could be considered correct, there are still severe difficulties that
arise when one considers the binding Supreme Court precedent of Clark v. Martinez,2 09 which held that "the meaning of words in a statute cannot change with
the statute's application., 210 Despite the technically limited nature of the Santos
holding that is inevitable under the Marks rule, Justice Scalia was very specific
about the intended effect of his opinion, insisting that counsel choosing to argue
for the "gross receipts" definition after
Santos be prepared to "explain why it
2 11
doesn't overrule Clark v. Martinez."
In Martinez, the Supreme Court was faced with interpreting the words
"may be detained" in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), a statute concerning alien deten21
tion. 2 12 The statute covered three categories of aliens:
(1) those ordered removed who are inadmissible under § 11 82,
(2) those ordered removed who are removable under
§ 1227(a)(1)(C), § 1227(a)(2), or § 1227(a)(4), and (3) those
ordered removed whom the Secretary determines to be either a
risk to the community or a flight risk.213
The Court had already held that a Category 2 alien could only be detained as
long as "reasonably necessary" to remove them from the country.214 The Martinez case involved a Category 1 alien. 2 5 The Supreme Court held the "reasonably necessary" interpretation of "may be detained" that had been utilized for
207

Id. at 2031.

208

See Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d at 189; see also United States v. Kratt, 579 F.3d 558,

562 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that "Justice Stevens' approach provides a logical subset of Justice

Scalia's approach - at least in terms of outcomes").
543 U.S. 371 (2005).
210 United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2030 (2008) (plurality opinion) (citing Martinez,
209

543 U.S. at 378).
211

Id. at 2031.

212

Martinez, 543 U.S. at 378.

213

Id.

214

Id.

215

Id. at 374 75.
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Category 2 aliens must also apply to Category 1 aliens 216 because "[t]o give
these same words a different meaning for each category would be to invent a
statute rather than interpret one. ' 21 The Court argued that if one of the statute's
applications required a limited
interpretation, "[t]he lowest common denomina21 8
tor, as it were, must govern.",
The application of this decision to Santos is plain. Justice Stevens settled on a narrowed interpretation of Section 1956 for predicate gambling offenses because he feared the "perverse result" of applying the "gross receipts"
definition. 219 Therefore, he indicated that the "lowest common denominator" in
Section 1956's application was the "profits" definition. As the Court argued in
Martinez,
[i]t is not at all unusual to give a statute's ambiguous language a
limiting construction called for by one of the statute's applications, even though the other of the statute's applications,
stand22
0
limitation.
same
the
support
not
would
ing alone,
Justice Stevens' only defense for his position's conflict with Martinez was that
the Santos case represented unspecified "compelling reasons" for sanctioning
alternate definitions based upon the application of the statute. 22 However, as
Justice Scalia noted, "[n]ot only do the Justices joining this opinion reject [Justice Stevens'] view, but also (apparently) so do the Justices joining the principal
dissent., 222 Indeed, Justice Alito specifically disagreed with Justice Stevens'
arguments, stating that "[t]he meaning of the term 'proceeds' cannot vary from
one money laundering case to the next. 223 Thus, seven Justices, all but Justice
Thomas 224 and Justice Stevens, affirmed Martinez by holding that there must be
a singular interpretation of the term "proceeds" in Section 1956(a)(1). 225 As a
216
217

218

Id. at 378.
Id.
Martinez, 543 U.S. at 378 (noting that if a statute has criminal applications, the rule of lenity

becomes applicable).
219
United States v.Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2034 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
220
Martinez, 543 U.S. at 380 (emphasis added): see also Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2030 (plurality
opinion).
221 Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2032 (Stevens, J., concurring).
222 Id. at 2031 (plurality opinion) (citing id. at 2036, 2044).
223

224

Id. at 2045.
Interestingly, Justice Thomas also dissented in Clark v.Martinez, which is perhaps why he

declined to join in Justice Scalia's attack on Justice Steven's concurrence.
225
Seven members of the Court explicitly rejected that the meaning of the term "proceeds"
could vary based on the factual context of the offense. See id. at 2030 (plurality opinion) (Justice
Scalia, jointed by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, cites Clark v.Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005), for

the proposition that "the meaning of words in a statute cannot change with the statute's application."); see also Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2035-36 (Alito, J., dissenting) (Justice Alito, joined by the
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majority of the Supreme Court settled on the "profits" definition for one predicate offense in Santos, it follows that a lower court's application of the "gross
receipts" definition to another predicate offense would violate the principles of
statutory interpretation set forth in Martinez absent a clear decision from the
Supreme Court. The Narrow Santos courts (and the Moderate Santos courts,
discussed infra) are effectively changing the meaning of a statute based upon its
application, a position that is in direct conflict with binding Supreme Court
precedent.
B.

Moderate Santos: A Critical View

The Third Circuit, 226 the Sixth Circuit, 22 7 and the Ninth Circuit 22 8 Courts
of Appeals, as well as at least one district court, 229 have thus far adopted a position that can perhaps best be characterized as moderate, and as such this Note
classifies them as "Moderate Santos" courts. These courts advocate a position
that flows neatly from Justice Stevens' concurrence, appearing to agree that they
"need not pick a single definition of 'proceeds' applicable to every unlawful
activity. 2 30 Indeed, these courts apply the "profits" definition to some SUAs
outside of the gambling context but keep the "gross receipts" definition for other
SUAs. This Part explains the varying rationales that underlie the Moderate Santos courts' decisions and provides criticism for their positions.
In United States v. Yusuf,23' the Third Circuit considered a money laundering charge arising from the predicate offense of mail fraud.232 After discussChief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, notes that "1 cannot agree with Justice Stevens'

approach insofar as it holds that the meaning of the term "proceeds" varies depending on the
nature of the illegal activity that produces the laundered funds."). How post-Santos money laundering cases based on SUAs outside of the gambling context would fare if they were taken to the
Supreme Court is uncertain. As the Fifth Circuit noted,
Thus the outcome could be that in a future case in the contraband realm, Justice Stevens would switch his definition to receipts, but one or more Santos
dissenter would join the majority in holding that "proceeds" means profits not because they have changed their minds about what Congress intended, but
because principles of stare decisis and statutory interpretation demand that
"proceeds" in this statute be interpreted consistently.
United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 768. 784 (5th Cir. 2008). Additionally. the replacement of Justice
Souter with Justice Sotomayor adds yet another wrinkle to how the Court would view post-Santos
caselaw.
226
Compare United States v. Yusuf, 536 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2008), with United States v. Fleming, 287 Fed. App'x. 150 (3d Cir. 2008).
227
United States v. Kratt, 579 F.3d 558, 623 (6th Cir. 2009).
228
United States v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2009).
229
See United States v. Smith. 623 F. Supp. 2d 693, 702 (W.D. Va. 2009).
230
United States v. Santos, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2032 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
231 536 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2008).
232

Id. at 187.
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ing the Santos case, the court acknowledged that United States v. Grasso,233 a
case in the original circuit split holding that "proceeds" meant "gross receipts"
in Section 1956, had been overruled.234 The court seemed to adopt Justice Scalia's view of the precedential effect of Santos, recognizing that "'proceeds'
means 'profits' when there is no legislative history to the contrary.' 35 The
court went on to hold that "the 'proceeds' from the mail fraud in this case also
amount to 'profits' of mail fraud [in accordance with Santos]" because
the mail
236
fraud in question had negligible expenses and considerable revenue.
In a subsequent unpublished decision,237 the Third Circuit in United
States v. Fleming238 dealt with a money laundering charge arising from the predicate offense of selling contraband. 239 The court held that "the term 'proceeds'
includes ['gross receipts'] for drug sales., 240 The court put great weight on Justice Alito's point that five justices (Justice Stevens and the four dissenting Justices) agreed that "'proceeds' 'include[s] gross revenues from the sale of contra241
band and the operation of organized crime syndicates involving such sales.'
Given that a primary reason for this agreement in the Santos case was legislative
history, 242 this decision appears in agreement with the earlier Yusuf decision.
Thus, with these two opinions, the Third Circuit has applied the "profits" definition of "proceeds" to a predicate crime other than gambling, but retained the
"gross receipts" definition in regard to the predicate crime of selling contraband .243

233

381 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2004).

234

See discussion supra Part I.B.

235

Yiusuf 536 F.3d at 186 n. 12.

236

Id.at 190 (citing United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025, 2036 (2008)).

237

See U.S. Ct. of App. 3rd Cir. App. 1. lOP 5.7 for a discussion of the precedential value of

unpublished decisions in the Third Circuit.
238
287 Fed. App'x. 150 (3d Cir. 2008).
239 Id.at 155.
240

Id.

241

Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2035 (Alito, J., dissenting).

242

Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2035-2036 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("As Justice Alito rightly argues,

the legislative history of § 1956 makes it clear that Congress intended the term 'proceeds' to include gross revenues from the sale of contraband and the operation of organized crime syndicates
involving such sales.").
243 Whether the unpublished Fleming decision will be affirmed, or if the Third Circuit will use

the "gross receipts" definition outside of the contraband context, remains to be seen. Several
courts, when citing to the Third Circuit, have ignored the unpublished Fleming decision and use
Yusufto classify it as a Broad Santos Circuit, one that applies the "profits" definition to all predicate offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 2009) ("The
Third Circuit interpreted Santos broadly. as holding that 'the term 'proceeds,' as that term is used
in the federal money laundering statute, applies to criminal profits. not criminal receipts, derived
from a specified unlawful activity."').
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The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Kratt244 specifically rejected the
Narrow Santos courts' interpretations of both the Marks rule and the statutory
principles of Alcan Aluminum Corp. when it embraced its Moderate Santos position, noting that "fundamental disagreements about how to interpret a statute
do not necessarily destroy a subset-superset relationship between the two opinions., 245 The court argued,
[T]here is a coherent way to apply Marks here. Justice Stevens'
approach provides a logical subset of Justice Scalia's approach
- at least in terms of outcomes. '[P]roceeds' does not always
mean profits, as Justice Scalia concluded; it means profits only
when the § 1956 predicate offense creates a merger problem
that leads to a radicalincrease in the statutory maximum sentence and only when nothing in the legislative history suggests
that Congress intended such an increase. Whenever a predicate
offense satisfies this narrow rule, the Justices in the plurality
would hold "proceeds" means profits as well, because they
would define "proceeds" as profits for every predicate offense.246
The Sixth Circuit went on to hold that a court must consider, on an individualized predicate offense basis, (1) any contrary legislative history for either Section 1956 or 1957, and (2) any radical increase in the statutory maximum that
would occur under either Section 1956 or Section 1957.247 "If the Santos rule
applies under either statute [1956 or 1957]," the court held, "then 'proceeds'
means profits for both statutes. 248 Utilizing this analysis, the court then upheld
the Kratt defendant's conviction for money laundering arising from bank fraud
and making false statements on a loan application. 249 The court reasoned that
these crimes, as they involve transferring funds, technically "merged" with Section 1957 money laundering, but not in a relevant way; Section 1956 and 1957
have lower statutory maximums than bank fraud and false statement offenses,
and as such there could be no "perverse result" merger and the "profits" definition of Santos would not be triggered. 5
The Ninth Circuit followed suit in United States v. Van Alstyne. 251 it
noted that "only the desire to avoid a 'merger problem' united the five justices
244

579 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2009).

245

Id. at 562.

246

Id. (emphasis added).

247
248

Id. at 563.
Id.

249

Id. at 563 64.

250 Kratt, 579 F.3d at 563-64.
251 584 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2009).
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[in Santos]," and thus held that "'proceeds' means 'profits' where viewing
'proceeds' as receipts' would present a 'merger' problem of the kind that
troubled the plurality and concurrence in Santos."252 The Van Alstyne court,
dealing with a Ponzi scheme defendant that had been convicted of seven counts
of mail fraud and three counts of money laundering, 53 focused on the merger
problem almost exclusively in the sense of the payments themselves, arguing
that "Santos suggests ... that the 'profits' definition of 'proceeds' should apply
where the particular crime at issue depends on necessary payments, as it does
here. 254 The court noted that "it appears that many, if not all, of the fraud
counts of which [defendant] Van Alstyne was convicted could have been
charged
as money laundering as well, sharply illustrating the 'merger' problem.,, 255
The court went on to dismiss two of Van Alstyne's convictions for
money laundering that were based on "bank transfers inherent in the 'scheme'
central to the mail fraud charges" while keeping a money laundering conviction
for a transfer of funds that it held was unrelated to the underlying predicate of256
fense of mail fraud.
Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit thus restricted
its Santos analysis primarily to the "merger problem" of the actual payments
constituting the charged conduct and did not focus on legislative history or
whether the money laundering statute had a higher statuary maximum than the
predicate offense.257
1.

The Clark v. Martinez Problem

While the Moderate position avoids many of the issues discussed supra
involving the Marks rule 258 and the principles of Alcan Aluminum Corp.,259 this
approach runs squarely into the Clark v. Martinez problem.2 60 The Moderate
approach, while perhaps more in keeping with an accurate working of the Marks
rule, still changes the definition of "proceeds" dependent on the factual context
of the predicate offense. This result is in conflict with the principles of statutory
interpretation elucidated in Martinez.

252

Id. at 814.

253

Id. at 809.

254

Id. at 815.

255
256

Id.
Id. at 815-16.

257

Compare Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d at 813-16, with United States v. iratt, 579 F.3d 558, 562-

64 (6th Cir. 2009).
258

259
260

See discussion supra Part IV.A. 1.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
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An Unworkable Rule?

Despite its obvious conflict with previous Supreme Court precedent, the
Moderate Santos position also has problems with practical application. A statutory definition that varies on an ad hoc basis dependent on the factual context of
the offense runs the risk of doling out punishment in an exceedingly arbitrary
fashion. Moreover, such a piecemeal interpretation would not adequately inform potential defendants of the conduct that would bring them within the purview of the statute. As described supra, even the Moderate courts themselves
utilize different analytical paradigms to determine whether to use the "gross
receipts" or the "profits" definition.2 6'
Notably, the Sixth Circuit in Kratt argued that, although it felt compelled to use the Moderate position because of the Marks rule, it found the approach "unsatisfying," describing that:
[This approach] will require us to define 'proceeds' for over
250 predicate offenses.., a regime that will generate cottage
industry of Santos litigation for years to come. And it will
create a more severe notice/rule-of-lenity problem than the one
that predated Santos. 62
While cases challenging Section 1956 on the grounds of vagueness have thus far
been unsuccessful, 263 some commentators have argued that the utilization of the
ad hoc approach advocated by Justice Stevens would reinvigorate the vagueness
doctrine's applicability to Section 1956 and render it unconstitutional. 64 Thus,
although preferable analytically to the Narrow Santos position, the Moderate
Santos approach both invites sentencing unpredictability and potentially opens
up the statute to constitutional attacks.
C.

Broad Santos. A Possible Solution

Several district courts have thus far adopted an expansive view of Santos, applying the "profits" definition without limit to predicate offenses outside
of the gambling context; as such, this Note classifies them as Broad Santos
courts. Some of these courts seem to have simply assumed that Santos applied

261 See notes 226 256 and accompanying text.
262

Kratt, 579

F.3d at 563.

263 See William G.Phelps, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S. C.A.

§ 1956, Which Criminalizes Money Laundering, 121 A.L.R. FED. 525 (1994).
264

See Marc Fernich, Outside Counsel: Money LaunderingAfter Santos: A Supreme Mess, 240

N.Y.L.J. 4 (col. 3). Oct. 17, 2008. Fernich makes an argument that the Court's ruling in Santos
leaves section 1956 ripe for due-process vagueness challenge.
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to all predicate offenses under the money laundering statute,2 65 while at least one
court felt that this application was dictated by the Supreme Court's ruling in
Clark v. Martinez.266 This Part will proceed to argue that the Broad Santos position should be adopted by the remainder of courts that have yet to speak on this

issue.
1.

The Clark v. Martinez Answer

Courts taking a Broad Santos position have often accepted the plurality's opinion with little fanfare. The District of New Jersey, for example, simply
noted that it "accepts the plurality in Santos as a statement of law, as of the date
the offenses were committed, namely, that 'proceeds' as used in the money
laundering statute means 'profits' and not 'receipts.', 267 Other courts have applied the "profits" definition to varying predicate offenses outside of the gambling context with little notice or mention of the rancorous debate among the
courts.268
265

See, e.g.. Abuhouran v. Grondolsky, 643 F. Supp. 2d 654. 670 (D.N.J. 2009) ("Th[is] Court

accepts the plurality in Santos as a statement of law, as of the date the offenses were committed,
namely. that 'proceeds' as used in the money laundering statute means 'profits' and not 'receipts."'): see also infra note 268.

266

United States v. Hedlund, No. CR-06-346-DLJ, 2008 WL 4183958, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
09. 2008) (holding that "this Court believes that the Supreme Court in Santos had held that the
word 'proceeds' in [the money laundering statute] means 'profits' and that Clark v. Martinez
requires that this meaning must apply to every SUA listed in the statute"): see also United States
v. Baker, No. 06-cr-20663, 2008 WL 4056998, at *3 (noting that "the government is on shaky
ground in relying on Justice Stevens's distinctions" because seven justices agree that the meaning
of a statute cannot vary based on its application.).
267

Abuhouran. 643 F.Supp.2d at 670.

268
United States v. Martin, No. 08-0026-02-CR-W-FJG, 2009 WL 330867, at * 11 (W.D. Mo.
Feb. 09, 2009) (noting that, for the predicate offense of unlawfully distributing prescription medication. "[w]hether the government will introduce sufficient evidence that the alleged laundered
proceeds were profits of the unlawful activity is a question that cannot be resolved prior to the
Government's presentation of its case to the jury"): United States v. Rezko, No. 05-CR-691, 2008
WL 4890232. at *5 n.2 (N.D. 111.Nov. 12, 2008) (holding that a jury had been instructed on "profits" consistent with Santos, and noting that, regardless, the Seventh Circuit applies the "profits"
definition to SUAs outside of the gambling context); United States v. Bohuchot, No. 3:07-CR167-L, 2008 WL 4849324, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2008) (holding that, for the predicate offense
of bribery, "the term 'proceeds' in the money laundering claim requires a showing of 'profits.');
United States v. Poulsen 568 F. Supp. 2d 885, 914 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 01, 2008) (recognizing in
dicta that, for the predicate offense of securities and wire fraud, if the government's case rested on
"alle[gations] that the Defendants laundered money by paying their employees or paying costs
associated with marketing their NPF programs or the services of outside professionals ....

Then

under Santos, Defendants' convictions would have to be vacated"); United States v. Shelburne,
563 F. Supp. 2d 601, 605 (W.D.Va. Jul. 01, 2008) (holding, for the predicate offense of healthcare
fraud, that the narrow construction of Santos was incorrect, and expenses are not proceeds within
the meaning of Santos); United States v. Thompson, No. 3:06-CR-123, 2008 WL 2514090, at * I
(E.D. Tenn. Jun. 19. 2008) (for the predicate offense of fraud, finding that "the government will
have to prove at trial whether all or some part of the monies (the 'proceeds') paid to [the defendant] were profits").
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In United States v. Hedlund,269 an unpublished decision that was one of
the first to arrive after Santos was issued, a court in the Northern District of California bucked this lassiez-faire trend and engaged in an analysis of Santos in
the context of Clark v. Martinez. 70 Although the Ninth Circuit has since
preempted this decision with Van Alstyne, 71 discussed supra, the Hedlund
court's analysis is useful. Hedlund involved a defendant that was convicted of
73
one count of Use of Property for the Purposes of Manufacturing Marijuana
and one count of money laundering for a mortgage payment that he had made
274
on
the government,
marijuana warehouse.
Rejecting
by the
the Hedlund court
noted,the Narrow Santos position offered
This Court cannot accept the government's argument. It does
not confront Clark v. Martinez, and its consideration in Santos.... The specific result of Santos is that five Justices voted
that "proceeds"
means
"profits"
in
18
U.S.C.
§
1956(a)(1)(A)(i). This decision came about in a case where the
SUA was gambling, but the Supreme Court did not hold that
their decision applied "only" to gambling cases. . . . Justice
Alito agreed with this position, specifically stating that he did
not "see how the meaning of the term 'proceeds' can vary depending on the nature of the illegal activity that produced the
laundered funds." Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2044 (Alito, J., dissenting). 75
The Hedlund court went on to hold that "[t]he result of this analysis is
that this Court believes that the Supreme Court in Santos has held that the word
'proceeds' in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(I) means 'profits,' and that Clark v.
Martinez requires that this meaning must apply to every SUA listed in the sta-

269

No. CR-06-346-DLJ, 2008 WL 4183958 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008).

270

543 U.S. 371 (2005).

271

584 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2009).

272

See supra notes 251 - 257 and accompanying text.

273

Hedlund, 2008 WL 4183958 at * 1 (in violation of2l U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)).

274

Id.at *1 (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2956(a)(1)(A)(i)).

275 Id. at *6. Interestingly, the Hedlund court was dealing with a drug conviction, arguably one
of the "heartland" activities singled out by both Justice Stevens and Justice Alito as requiring a

"gross receipts" definition. See United States v. Santos, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2035-36 (Alito, J., dis-

senting). The Hedlund court argued, "the government is correct that five of the Justices said that
Congress intended that 'proceeds' should mean gross receipts in drug trafficking cases. But the
bottom line is thatfive Justices said that, but they did not vote that." Hedlund, 2008 WL 4183958
at *6 (emphasis added).
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tute.' ' 276 The court subsequently vacated the defendant's money laundering
conviction. 277
As noted by Hedlund, the Broad Santos position is the only one of the
approaches currently utilized by the courts that avoids the problematic issue of
Clark v. Martinez. As this approach employs the "profits" definition of
"proceeds" for all factual applications of Section 1956, it does not conflict with
any binding principles of statutory interpretation. 278 As discussed supra,2 79 the
Santos Court settled on a "lowest common denominator" 280 when it held that the
"profits" definition applied to the predicate offense of illegal gambling; to allow
the definition
to oscillate would be to "invent a statute rather than interpret
281
one."
2.

The "Profits" Analysis: Workable in Practice

One of the primary concerns for both the government and the dissent in
Santos were the "pointless and difficult problems" involved in proving the statutory elements of Section 1956 under a "profits" definition.2 82 Justice Alito describes these as "nettlesome problems that Congress cannot have wanted," and
this appears to be a primary rationale upon which the dissent advocated for a
"gross receipts" definition.283 Indeed, this argument was almost the entire basis
for Justice Alito's legislative history argument: "it is most unlikely that Congress meant to enact a money laundering statute that would present daunting
,,24
obstacles [to prosecution]..
However, the dire evidentiary consequences that
Justice Alito predicted in his dissent have not come to pass. A great number of
courts considering the scope of Santos have declined to answer the ultimate
issue concerning the applicability of the "profits" definition but have, instead,
moved on to quite easily classify the transaction in question as involving "prof,,2 s5
its.
276

Id.

277

Id.

278

United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2030 (2008) (plurality opinion).

279

See discussion supra Part IV.A.3 and Part IV.B. 1.

280

Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005).

281

Id.

282

Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2038 (Alito, J., dissenting).

283

Id. at 2039.

284

Id. at 2040.

285 See United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 784 (5th Cir. 2008): United States v. Achobe,
560 F.3d 259, 269 (5th Cir. 2008); Choiniere v. United States, Nos. 3:07-CV-27 RM, 3:05-CR-56,
2009 WL 112585, at *12 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 14, 2009); United States v. Happ, No. CR2-06-129(8),
2008 WL 5101227, at *2 3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 25, 2008): United States v. Bohuchot, No. 3:07-CR167-L, 2008 WL 4849324, at *4-6 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2008); United States v. Varnado, No.
3:06CR415, 2008 WL 4773057, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2008); United States v. Spencer, No.
07-174 (JRT/JJG), 2008 WL 4104693, at *4-5 (D. Minn. Aug. 29, 2008); United States v. Baker,
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Several courts thus far appear to be following Justice Scalia's "single
instance" or "expense" test for proving profits:
[T]o establish the proceeds element under the "profits" interpretation, the prosecution need to show only that a single instance
of specified unlawful activity was profitable and gave rise to the
money involved in a charged transaction . . . [w]hat counts is
whether the receipts from the charged unlawful act exceeded
the costsfairly attributableto it .286

This test essentially attempts to eliminate precisely what caused the "merger
problem" in Santos: overlap between the essential business-type transactions
needed to complete the underlying offense and a double-counting of those transactions for the charge of money laundering. So far, it seems that the practical
impact of Santos has been to center courts on the issue of whether the financial
transaction in question can be categorized as an essential "expense" of the un2
derlying crime. 28
87 This approach eliminates the "merger problem" and also JusNo. 06-cr-20663. 2008 WL 4056998, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 27, 2008); United States v. Everett,
No. CR 06-795-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 3843831, at *7 (D. Ariz. Aug 14, 2008): United States v.
Poulsen, 568 F. Supp. 2d 885, 913 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2008).
286
Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2029 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added): see also Brown, 553 F.3d at
784 (applying the "single instance" test to the SUA of unlawfully selling prescription medication
and holding that "[i]n the instant case, the government introduced ample, unchallenged evidence
that the sales were profitable, even with overhead and supplies factored in as 'costs fairly attributable' to the sale").
287
See United States v. Yusuf, 536 F.3d 178, 190 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that the "proceeds'
from the mail fraud in this case also amount to 'profits' of mail fraud" because the costs associated with mailing are negligible); Abuhouran v. Grondolsky, 643 F. Supp. 2d 654. 671 (D.N.J.
2009) ("Unlike paying a lottery winner, the money laundering payments in the instant case....
were not 'costs of a crime .... '"); Happ, 2008 WL 5101227, at *2 (for the SUA of fraud, "the
transactions that formed the basis for [the defendants] money-laundering convictions had nothing
to do with paying their expenses."); United States v. Rezko, No. 05-CR-691, 2008 WL 4890232 at
*6 (N.D. 111.Nov. 12, 2008) (holding that, for the SUA of mail fraud, the "checks did not constitute expenses of the underlying fraudulent activity." ); Bohuchot. 2008 WL 4849324, at *4 (agreeing that "the transactions involved profits because the acceptance of a bribe by a government
official does not involve any expenses."):- Varnado, 2008 WL 4773057, at *6 (for the SUA of
health care fraud, defendant's "profit sharing" agreement upon which her conviction was based
explicitly provided that any profit was to be distributed equally among co-conspirators after receipts were paid); Everett, 2008 WL 3843831, at *7 (upholding a money laundering conviction for
the SUA of defrauding the Bankruptcy Court, holding that the "proceeds" in question were not
expenses but profits of the scheme); see also Spencer, 2008 WL 4104693, at *4 (for the SUA of
cocaine distribution, house purchase was "personal expense paid with the profits of his illegal
activity, rather than the type of business expense described in Santos."); Baker, 2008 WL
4056998, at *4 (noting that, for the SUA of drug trafficking. the defendants "purchased cars,
homes, and jewelry for their own use with some part of the money that they did not intend for
essential expenses related to drug trafficking .... "); Poulsen, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 913 (same);
United States v. Shelburne, 563 F. Supp. 2d 601, 607 (W.D. Va. 2008) (finding, for the predicate

offense of health care fraud, that "Dr. Shelburne's payments for building and equipment rent and
dental supplies were not from proceeds as that term is properly construed under the money laun-
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tice Alito's concerns about the forced development of "special accounting rules"
and the like.28
Some examples of money laundering convictions that have actually
been vacated by a court utilizing the "profits" approach for Section 1956(a)(1)
offenses are useful here. The vacated money laundering charges include a doctor's conviction for "payments for building and equipment rent and dental supplies" for the predicate offense of healthcare fraud, 28 9 a marijuana agriculturalist's conviction for "a mortgage payment on the building used to grow the marijuana" for the predicate offense of "Use of Property for the Purposes of Manufacturing Marijuana,, 290 and a moonshiner's convictions for mortgage payments
on a house stemming from the predicate offense of operating an illegal moonshining business. 29' These courts are not allowing nefarious criminals to escape
justice upon technicalities; to the contrary, they are merely correcting the overlap between the substantive offense and the money laundering statute. Consequently, these courts are not allowing a conviction to be unduly enhanced for a
transaction that forms the very basis of the underlying offense.292
Far from creating an "insurmountable hurdle ' 293 for money laundering
prosecutions, the use of the "profits" definition has proven quite workable in
practice. Courts performing a "profits" analysis of varied predicate offenses
have largely been eliminating the merger issues and leaving the rest, and the
"merger problem," as Santos clearly indicates, was one that troubled all nine of
294
the Justices.
Therefore, the Broad Santos position, in addition to being the
295
most legally sound of the three paths currently taken by courts,
is also the
most practical.

dering statute . . . the two payments of salary to Dr. Shelburne were [gross receipts] since they
could only come from the profits of his specified unlawful activity.").
288
289
290

Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2040-41 (Alito, J.. dissenting).
Shelburne, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
See United States v. Hedlund, No. CR-06-346-DLJ. 2008 WL 4183958. at *5 (N.D. Cal.

Sep. 09. 2009).
See United States v. Smith. 623 F. Supp. 2d 693, 702 03 (W.D.Va. 2009).

291

292

See, e.g., id. at 702.
Here, as in Santos, it would be a "perverse result" if revenue from the illegal
moonshine business used to pay its essential expenses could constitute a money laundering violation. The maximum statutory penalty for any underlying
moonshine violation charged in this case is five years (see 18 U.S.C. §§ 371,
1952(a)(3)(A); 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a)), while the statutory maximum for money
laundering is 20 years (see 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)).

Id.
293

Petition for Certiorari, United States v. Santos, No. 06-1005, at 15 (Jan. 22. 2007).

294

Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2026, 2033, 2044.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.3. and Part IV.B. 1.
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The Impact of Indecision
a.

The Lack of Uniformity

As discussed supra, the punishments for violating Section 1956 are extremely harsh,2 96 and defendants who committed money laundering before the
statutory amendments of May 20, 2009, are now faced with a virulent statute in
a state of flux. As long as the courts remain split on this issue, it is inevitable
that like defendants will be treated dissimilarly merely based on the jurisdiction
of their court. While one defendant may find that his financial transaction consisted of an unchargeable "expense" of his underlying crime, a similar defendant
making the exact same transaction in a different state may find that he faces a
twenty-year statutory maximum, 297 a large fine, 298 forfeiture of any property
"involved in" the transaction, 299 and a two-level increase in his base offense
level.3"'
b.

The Complication of Retroactivity

This situation is further complicated by the potential for Santos to apply
retroactively on collateral review. A newly created rule announced by the Supreme Court can apply retroactively on collateral review in an otherwise timely,
first habeas motion only if "(1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a 'watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and
accuracy of the criminal proceeding., 30 A rule is substantive if it "alters the
range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes. 30 2 For a Moderate or Broad Santos court, there is potentially an argument that the "profits"
definition of Section 1956 could be applied retroactively; the narrowed interpretation of "proceeds" in Section 1956 could be considered to "alter[] the range of
3°3
conduct
. . that the law punishes,",
Supreme
Court
previously
held that ."decisions
that narrow the scopeand
of athe
criminal
statute
by has
interpreting
its

296

See discussion supra Part II.A.

297

See 18 U.S.C. § 1956: "Whoever [violates this statute] .. . shall be sentenced to a fine of

not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever
is greater. or imprisonment for not more than twenty years. or both."
299

Id.
18 U.S.C. §§ 981 982.

300

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, at

298

3

§ 2S 1.1
(b)(2)(B).
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311

(1989)). It appears that Santos would not be applicable in a second or successive habeas petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (2006) due to the restrictions of Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656,
662 (2001), which specifies that "the requirement [of retroactivity] is satisfied only if this Court
has held that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review."
302 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004).
303

Id.
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terms" are retroactive substantive rules.30 4 Indeed, the Santos case itself arose
from a collateral attack.30 5
The decisions regarding the retroactive applicability of Santos have
been spotty at best. While a majority of courts thus far reject retroactivity, 306 at
least one district court has retroactively applied Santos as a substantive change
in the law.30 7 However, for Narrow Santos courts, even the argument for retroactive applicability is almost completely foreclosed by the fact that the "profits" definition, and any accompanying retroactive decriminalization, is limited
solely to the predicate offense of operating an unlawful gambling business. 30 8
Thus, for all predicate offenses under Narrow Santos courts and some predicate
offenses under Moderate Santos courts, any argument for retroactive application
is an immediate failure. This means that the potential for disparate punishment
for the same conduct has the possibility of stretching even further than discussed
supra. In a Broad Santos jurisdiction, both new defendants and previously convicted felons whose money laundering convictions are not based on "profits"
could potentially benefit greatly from Santos; in a Narrow Santos jurisdiction,
there is no question that defendants' previous convictions and substantially
higher sentences 30 9 will remain untouched.

304

Id. at 351 52.

305

Santos v. United States, 461 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2006).
See, e.g., Wooten v. Cauley, No. 09-CV-67-HRW. 2009 WL 3834093, at *5 (E.D.Ky. 2009)

306

(citing cases).
Siu v. United States, Nos. C08-1407-JCC, CR02-0192-JCC, 2009 WL 2032028, at *8

307

(W.D. Wash. 2009) ("Here, as the government concedes, both Santos and Cuellar are new substantive rules because they narrow the scope of the federal money laundering statute. Because this
is Petitioner's first § 2255 motion. Santos and Cuellar apply retroactively to his motion."); see
also Santana v. United States, Nos. C08-1493-JLR, CR06-220-JLR, 2009 WL 1228556. at *1 n.2
(W.D. Wash. 2009) (noting that the government conceded that Santos may be applied retroactively on collateral review).
3

See, e.g.. Ghali v. Roy. No. 5:08-CV-135, 2009 WL 1929847. at *4 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (After

analyzing Santos, this court noted that "this court cannot entertain the proposition in a Section
2241 proceeding unless Santos affirmatively decriminalized petitioner's conduct. As determined
above, Santos did not decriminalize financial transactions conducted with the funds from drug
trafficking."); Arnaiz v. Hickey, No. CV208-97, 2009 WL 2971638, at *3 (S.D. Ga. 2009) ("Arnaiz fails to present evidence that his claims are based on a retroactively applicable Supreme
Court decision because Santos is not applicable to the case at bar.").
3o9 The situation involving retroactivity is especially important to those defendants who were
sentenced under the pre-2001 money laundering guidelines, which were not made retroactive. See
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, at app. C, amend. 634. For white-collar
criminals sentenced under the pre-2001 Guidelines, the addition of a money laundering charge
regularly resulted in a sentence almost four times larger than what would otherwise have been
incurred. Carpenter, supra note 35. at 558 59 (citing THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL
SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE, §§ 2F1.1, 2S1.1 (1998)).
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Lessons from FERA?

With testimony that "[t]he Court's [Santos] decision effectively limited
the money laundering statute to profitable crimes,, 3 10 Congress worked to correct the massive judicial confusion after Santos by amending the money laundering statue to define "proceeds" as "gross receipts. ,311 Although not applicable to crimes that occurred prior to its enactment, FERA contains some interesting passages for courts and attorneys still jockeying for their post-Santos position.
FERA contains a section entitled "Sense 3 12
of the Congress and Report
Concerning Required Approval for Merger Cases.
(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS. -It
is the sense of the Congress
that no prosecution of an offense under section 1956 or 1957 of
title 18, United States Code, should be undertaken in combination with the prosecution of any other offense, without prior approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General,

the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division, or the relevant United States Attorney,if the conduct to
be chargedas "specified unlawful activityo" in connection with
the offense under section 1956 or 1957 is so closely connected
with the conduct to be charged as the other offense
that there is
313
no clear delineation between the two offenses.
The section goes on to require that the Attorney General submit a report to both
the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary on May 20, 2010. 3 " These
reports must include (1) "[t]he number of prosecutions . . . undertaken during
the previous one-year period after prior approval . . . classified by type of offense," (2) "[t]he number of prosecutions . . . undertaken without such prior
approval ... , classified by type of offense, and the reasons why such prior approval was not obtained," and (3) "[t]he number of times during the previous
year in which an approval ... was denied. 3 15
3

The Need for IncreasedFraud Enforcement in the Wake of the Economic Downturn: Hear-

ing Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Feb. 11, 2009, available at

http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfmid=365 1&wit id=7604 (statement of Rita
Glavin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, United States Department of Jus-

tice).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9) (West 2009) ("[T]he term 'proceeds' means any property derived from or obtained or retained, directly or indirectly, through some form of unlawful activity.
including the gross receipts of such activity.").
312

Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617, 1618 19.

313

Id. at 1619.

314

Id.
Id.

315
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While it is too early to tell what effect this "Sense of the Congress" will
have on money laundering prosecutions, what this section does reveal is that the
fundamental unfairness of the merger problem as discussed in Santos is also a
major concern for the 111th Congress. The adoption of this provision in FERA
represents a major victory for the defense bar and a step forward in ensuring
future fairness in charging decisions. 316 Regardless, the original Money Laundering Control Act contained no such merger protections. The Narrow Santos
courts necessarily limit their ability to address the injustice of this important
issue when they refuse to expand the protections of Santos to eliminate this
problem, a problem that is now recognized by both Congress and the Supreme
Court.
d.

A Call for Clarity

The three-way division in the courts after Santos creates severe disparities between similarly situated defendants. Both the Narrow and the Moderate
Santos courts, by advocating differing interpretations of the word "proceeds" in
Section 1956, exacerbate this disparity as well as run afoul of established principles of statutory interpretation. Given that Broad Santos courts can provide
uniformity and both Broad and Moderate Santos courts have proven that the
application of the "profits" definition outside of the gambling context can be
practically applied and eliminate the "merger problem," the proper interpretation of the Santos decision becomes more clear. It is the hope of this Author
that the analysis provided supra of the post-Santos decisions on the scope of
Section 1956 clarifies both the current state of the law as well as persuades that
the fastest way to equity, clarity, and uniformity is the unvarying application of
the "profits" definition to all of Section 1956's predicate offenses.
V.

CONCLUSION

With the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Santos,3 the ever-expanding world of federal money laundering became a little smaller; unfortunately, it did not become any clearer. This Note attempts to shed some light
on a definitional debate that has already caused two separate circuit splits and
continues to create a flurry of activity in undecided courts. The current threeway division of the courts ensures that there will be a great deal of protracted
litigation in the future - all that remains is to choose sides.
This Note demonstrates that courts should use the Broad Santos model
to interpret the Santos decision. Applying the "profits" definition of "proceeds"
316

See Tiffany M. Joslyn. FERA 's Silver Lining

An Account of NACDL 's Efforts Combating

Overeriminalization, THE
CHAMPION,
Aug.
2009,
at
56,
available
at
http://www.criminaljustice.org/public.nsf/01 cI e7698280d20385256d0b00789923/8997d590b8b2a
37b85257643005f5783?OpenDocument.
317

128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008).
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to all Section 1956 predicate offenses is the soundest way to ensure conformance with precedent as well as maintain the principles of uniformity and equity in the federal money laundering statute.
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